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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant part of Respondent's military retirement by con-
cluding the parties intended to resolve all property distri-
bution and alimony issues in their Stipulation incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT PART OF 
RESPONDENT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT. 
The appellate Court in a divorce proceeding should 
indulge in all reasonable presumptions in favor of the 
regularity and correctness of the actions of the lower 
Court. The lower Court Judgment should not be reversed 
unless it is clearly shown that the discretionary power of 
the Court was improperly exercised. 27A C.J.S., Divorce, 
Section 194, 817-822; Rambrough vs. Bethers, 522 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1 9 7 6 ) . The general rule in determining whether judi-
cial discretion has been abused is whether the trial Judge 
correctly perceived the law and demonstrated due considera-
tion of the facts and circumstances. Sheets vs. Agro-Uest, 
Inc. , 644 P.2d 787 (Idaho 1 9 8 3 ) . 
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POINT II 
THE FEDERALLY ENACTED SPOUSES' PROTEC-
TION ACT ALLOWS FOR DISCRETION OF A 
STATE COURT IN AN AWARD OF RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS. 
Appellant's counsel argues that the Act requi red the 
Court to modify the Divorce Decree and determine the alloca-
tion of military benefits (Appellant's Brief, page 4, next 
to last l i n e ) . This is incorrect for the Uni form Servi ces 
Former Spouses' Protection Act, (10 U.S.C. Section 1408) 
provides : 
"Subject to the limitations of this 
Section, the Court may treat disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to a 
member for pay periods beginning June 
25, 1981 either as property solely of 
the member or as property of the member 
and his spouse in accordance with the 
law of the jurisdiction of such Court." 
[Emphasis added] 
In Wallace vs. Wallace, 671 P.2d 711 (Or. Appl. 1 9 8 3 ) , 
the wife appealed from a decision where her retired husband 
received all his military retirement. The appellate Court 
stated : 
"The Act permits, but does not require, 
state courts to consider military re-
tirement as marital property." (p. 715) 
The lower Court did not fail to properly apply the Act 
itself. It merely interpreted the "Stipulation" entered 
into by the parties and then ruled that the evidence and 
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pleadings before it did not justify a modification of the 
terms of the divorce in this particular case. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HADE A REASONABLE INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE STIPULATION BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
The lower Court did not treat alimony and military 
retirement as being the same thing. The Court's remarks 
were directed more to the general purpose of alimony and 
property distribution in divorce cases. In the Summary of 
Utah Family Law, author James Vander Roest states that one 
of the common purposes for an award of alimony is: 
"...allocation of the parties 1 resources 
(income) to enable them to reconstruct 
their lives as happily as possible. 
This carries with it an implicit recog-
nition that property settlements and 
alimony awards are interdependent." 
B.Y.U.J. Legal Stud., Summary of Utah 
Family Law, Sec. 13.5, p. 314. 
One example of such interdependency is in -Duboi s vs. 
Dubois, 29 Utah. 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 19 7 3 ) , wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a lower Court's decision to 
reduce alimony to $1.00 per year. The Court held: 
"It is quite evident that the Court in 
its decision took into account the 
source of the assets which comprised the 
marital estate...it appears that the 
income from the assets awarded to the 
Plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her 
in the manner to which she is accustomed 
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without periodic payments from the 
Defendant." p. 1381 
The lower Court in the present case examined paragraph 
eight of the parties' "Stipulation" which combines and 
finalizes, by its wording, both property distribution and 
alimony. The Court stated that it believed the parties 
"intended full well" that Appellant's receipt of "the 
$8,500.00 in Savings" concluded the retirement issue. 
Counsel for Appellant now argues that the only intention of 
the parties was to pay a "lump sum alimony settlement". 
It is submitted that only Appellant's sworn testimony 
as to her intentions could have refuted the written document 
as the Court interpreted it. After the passage of nearly 
four (4) years since the divorce, it would be guesswork to 
re-adjust the terms of the Stipulation by awarding Appellant 
part of the military retirement. Would Respondent have 
agreed to give Appellant the $8,500.00 which possibly com-
prised their only savings with any cash value at that time? 
Would the personal property have been distributed in the 
same way? 
Appellant chose to litigate the matter in Utah although 
both she and Respondent live thousands of miles away. 
Appellant set the date and time for hearing. Respondent 
filed a detailed Answer to Appellant's Affidavit and sup-
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porting Memorandum of Points and Authorities on November 7, 
1985. 
The hearing was not held for another five (5) months 
(April 8, 1986). Appellant had ample time to make arrange-
ments to be present on her Court date. She chose not to 
appear and testify at the Court hearing. Given these facts, 
the lower Court had no choice but to interpret the intent of 
the parties by the words they agreed to in their Stipula-
tion, and it did so in a fair and reasonable manner. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed a lower Court 
which had granted an ex-husband's motion to reduce alimony. 
It held that the trial Court could not modify a 1971 Decree 
where the Stipulation was entered into so that both parties 
could settle their property rights and resolve all their 
duties and obligations to each other. The Colorado Court 
found monthly payments of alimony and property settlement 
were so inseparable that it would be impossible to revise 
one without the other. Stei nes vs. Stei nes, 583 P.2d 491 
(Colo. 1 9 7 5 ) . 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT MADE A DECISION 
ON THE SAME ISSUES ON FEBRUARY 27, 1986. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the same issues pre-
sently before this Court in Sayman vs. Sayman, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 19826, filed February 27, 1986. 
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In that case, Plaintiff/Wife filed an Order to Show 
Cause and Affidavit in Re Modification of the Divorce Decree 
in April, 1983, The basis of the show cause order was that 
the trial court had not considered the issue of military 
retirement in the original Decree, Plaintiff alleged that 
the material change in circumstances consisted of the adop-
tion of the Uniform Services Former Spouses f Protection Act 
in August, 1982. 
The trial Court had ruled that the military retirement 
was taken into consideration in the distribution of the 
marital property, in that the wife was given "an inordinate 
amount of furniture". The lower Court also ruled that the 
new Federal legislation did not constitute a material or 
substantial change of circumstances that would warrant 
modification of the Decree. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
"Under traditional rules of appellate 
review, the trial court has wide discre-
tion in cases of this type. The court's 
judgment as to property division will be 
disturbed only on a showing of abuse of 
discretion... There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's ruling in the instant case 
and there was no abuse of discretion." 
[This opinion was not published in the 
Utah Reporter or the Pacific R e p o r t e r ] . 
The Judgment of the trial Court was then affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the lower Court properly exercised 
its discretion in determining that the parties intended to 
resolve all issues of property and alimony in their Stipula-
tion. That a fair and equitable distribution of the assets 
was made in the opinion of the Court, and that the Court is 
not compelled to make a specific award of retirement parti-
cipation by a spouse when property is awarded to the spouse 
in consideration of all property claims. Therefore, this 
Court should uphold the Judgment of the lower Court. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of June, 1987. 
r , . X / // / / / 
JiAffSH, 
Attorney/for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) copies of the 
above and foregoing by posting in the United States nail, 
postage pre-paid and addressed to Attorney Scott Holt, 
attorney for Defendant-Appellant, at 44 North Main, Suite 
101, Layton, Utah 84041. 
DATED this ol^ day of June, 1987. 
E J . tijxmv 
Attorney f^r Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE UF UTAH 
00O06 -
Erlinda T. Sayman, No. 19826 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
F I L E D 
February 27, 193 6 
Radford A. Sayman, _ _ 
Defendant and Respondent. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM:, 
Plaintiff appeals the denial of her petition for 
modification of a divorce decree* 
Trial in this matter was held in February, 1982. The 
parties had been married for eleven years and had one child. 
Plaintiff worked for Max Factor, earning $887 per month, and 
defendant was in the Air Force, earning $1,815 per month.1 No 
alimony was awarded, but defendant was ordered to pay $225 per 
month as child support. Plaintiff was awarded the family home 
(subject to a lien awarded to defendant in the amount of $3,500) 
and most of the household furnishings. Each party was awarded 
one of two automobiles. Defendant was to assume all debts and 
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage. 
In April, 1983, plaintiff filed an "order to show 
cause and affidavit in re modification" of the divorce decree. 
The sole basis of the show cause order was that the trial court 
had allegedly refused to consider the issue of retirement in 
the original decree. Plaintiff alleged that the changed 
circumstances (required for modification) consisted of a change 
in federal law.2 Following a hearing in November, 1983. the 
1. There was evidence adduced that plaintiff had worked as 
an air traffic controller in the Phillipines and also had a 
college degree in medical technology. Defendant was due to 
retire in November, 1982, at which time his military pay was 
expected to be about $825 per month. 
2. In McCarty V. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that state courts are precluded 
from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state 
property laws\upon dissolution of marriage. In August, 1982, 
Congress adopted the Uniform Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act, which provided that "a court may treat 
disposable retired pay payable to a member for periods 
(Continued on page 2») 
trial court ruled that plaintiff's retirement was taken into 
consideration in the distribution of the marital property in 
that plaintiff was given "an inordinate amount of furniture." 
The court also ruled that the new federal legislation did not 
constitute a material or substantial change of circumstances 
which would warrant modification of the decree. 
on appeal, without making any reference whatsoever to 
the record,3 plaintiff urges that the trial court erred in 
refusing to modify the divorce decree. In denying the re-
quested modification, the court reviewed the transcript of the 
divorce trial and ruled that defendant's retirement was con-
sidered in the property division. The transcript shows that 
She parties both freely testified as to monthly income defen-
dant would receive upon retirement. Xhe record suggests that 
although the judge could not have awarded plaintiff a direct 
interest in defendant's retirement (under McCarty), he could 
and did offset that by awarding plaintiff a disoroportionate 
share of the other marital property* 
Under traditional rules of appellate review, the trial 
court has wide discretion in cases of this type. The court's 
judgment as to property division will be disturbed only on a 
showing of abuse of discretion. Bushell v. Bushell, Utah, 649 
P.2d 85 (1982); Fogg v. Fogg, Utah, 671 P.2d 184 (1983). There 
is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial 
court's ruling in the instant case, and there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
The judgment of the trial court is therefore 
affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything 
significant to existing law and hence is not to be published 
in the Utah Reporter or the Pacific Reporter. 
(Footnote 2 continued.) 
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of 
the member or as property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). Utah treats retirement benefits 
accrued during marriage as marital property. Woodward v. 
Woodward, Utah, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). 
3. Such deficiency renders an appeal subject to dismissal. 
State v. Hutchings, Utah, 672 P.2d 404 (1983) • 
No. 1982€ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent were married on June 4, I960, 
The parties were granted a divorce, which was heard on 
December 1, 1981. An Amended Decree of Divorce was signed 
by the lower Court on December 11, 1981. 
Respondent makes objection to the assertion in Appel-
lant's Statement of Facts that "he (Respondent) had over 
twenty (20) years in military service." This was not deter-
mined at the hearing before the lower Court and there is 
nothing in the record to substantiate the actual amount of 
time served by Respondent in the military. 
The parties entered into a "Stipulation" dated October 
30, 1981, which was incorporated into the Amended Decree of 
Divorce. The key provision considered by the lower Court 
was: 
"8. The Defendant shall take the 
$8,500.00 in savings as and for full and 
final property settlement and thereby 
waives any present and future right to 
alimony." 
Neither party was present at the hearing on Appellant's 
Order to Show Cause. Appellant was residing in Florida and 
Respondent was residing in Georgia. The lower Court heard 
proffers of evidence by the parties 1 respective counsel and 
examined the pleadings submitted to the Court's file durinq 
the history of the case. 
2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JON E. HOLDERMAN, / 
Respondent, / Case No. 860207-CA 
vs. / 13-B 
SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN, / 
Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the decision of the 
lower Court denying the modification of the Decree "of 
Divorce to include additional benefits based uoon Federal 
Legislation concerning military retirement benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought as part of a prior divorce 
proceeding by an Order to Show Cause, wherein Appellant 
seeks modification of the Decree to divide Respondent's 
military retirement. The lower Court denied Appellant's 
request for division of Respondent's military retirement. 
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